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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS,

BEAR

RIVER

STATE OF UTAH

MUTUAL

INSURANCE COMPANY,

Plaintiff/Appellant,

Case No. 930566
920905486PD
Priority 15

v.
MIKE JACOBSEN and UTAH
VALLEY COMMUNITY COLLEGE,
a body politic of the
State of Utah,
Defendants/Appellees.

BRIEF OF APPELLEES
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Jurisdiction over this appeal
Supreme

Court by Utah Code Ann,

is conferred upon the Utah
§ 78-2-2(3) (j)

(Supp.

1993),

providing for appellate jurisdiction over "orders, judgments, and
decrees of any court of record over which the court of appeals does
not have original jurisdiction."
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
1.

Whether the trial court properly dismissed plaintiff's

Complaint alleging negligence against Utah Valley Community College
for failure to comply with the Governmental Immunity Act.
2.

Whether plaintiff's Complaint, whether sounding in tort

or contract, must be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon
which relief can be granted since plaintiff has failed to name the

proper party.
Standard of Review: Assuming the factual allegations made by
plaintiff to be true, the appellate court reviews the trial court's
rulings to see whether the prevailing party was nevertheless
entitled to dismissal as a matter of law. Therefore, the appellate
court applies a correction-of-error standard of review to the trial
court's ruling. Neel v. State, 854 P.2d 581, 582 (Utah App. 1993);
citing Anderson v. Dean, 841 P.2d 742, 744 (Utah App. 1992).
DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS
Determinative provisions are reproduced in Addendum A to this
Brief.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
This is an appeal from a final judgment dated October 13, 1993
of the Third Judicial District Court, Salt Lake County, Utah, the
Honorable Tyrone E. Medley presiding, granting defendant's motion
to dismiss plaintiff's claims for recovery of payment by plaintiff
(the insurer) to Larry J. Remm (the insured) of personal injury
protection benefits

(PIP benefits) arising from a low impact

automobile accident involving a second car driven by Mike Jacobsen,
an employee of Utah Valley Community College (the named defendant).
Course of the Proceedings and Disposition Below
Plaintiff filed its Complaint on January 20, 1993.

The

defendants timely moved for dismissal on February 1, 1993, stating
that plaintiff's Complaint was untimely, named the wrong party, and
failed to comply with the notice provisions of the Governmental
2

Immunity Act.

Plaintiff moved to amend the Complaint, then moved

to file a second amended Complaint.
15,

By a Minute Entry dated June

1993, Judge Medley granted defendant's motion to dismiss.

Plaintiff then moved to vacate the Minute Entry and requested oral
argument.

In a second Minute Entry dated September 15, 1993, the

trial court judge reiterated his prior ruling:

(1) defendants'

motion to dismiss plaintiff's first cause of action was granted for
failure to comply with the strict notice requirements of the Utah
Governmental

Immunity

Act;

(2)

defendants'

motion

to

dismiss

plaintiff's second cause of action was granted for failure to state
a claim upon which relief may be granted under § 31A-22-309(5); and
(3) the court specifically found the case Neel v. State "to be
distinguishable from the present case."

(Minute Entry and Order of

Dismissal attached as Addenda B and C.)

The Order of Dismissal was

entered on October 13, 1993, plaintiff was given Notice of Entry of
the Order on October 25, 1993 and this appeal was filed on November
12, 1993.
Statement of Facts
For

purposes

of

the

defendants'

motion

to

dismiss,

the

following facts were undisputed and are set forth in the light most
favorable to the plaintiff, the non-moving party.
On February 15, 1991 at approximately 1:00 p.m., a vehicle
operated by Larry J. Remm was hit by a vehicle operated by Mike
Jacobsen at a speed of approximately 2 miles per hour.

(The police

report describing the incident is attached hereto as Addendum D.)
While there was no damage to either vehicle, driver Remm alleged
3

damages totalling $2,257.00.

These medical expenses were paid by

Remm's insurance company, Bear River Mutual Insurance Company
pursuant to the policy's personal injury protection benefits. Bear
River Mutual Insurance Company brought this action against Mike
Jacobsen, who was, at the time at issue, an employee of Utah Valley
Community College, in an attempt to recover from him the PIP
benefits paid to Remm.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Plaintiff's complaint was properly dismissed for failure to
state a claim upon which relief can be granted as to these
answering defendants.

It is clear that under the laws of this

state an insurer does not have a tort claim against a private
person to recover PIP benefits.

Utah Code Ann. § 31A-22-309(1) ,

(1953, as amended) specifically excludes recovery from a tortfeasor of PIP benefits totalling less than $3,000.00. Accordingly,
the PIP benefits paid to Remm, without regard to fault, are not
recoverable from the insured tort-feasor by either the injured
party or his insurer.

In other words, under no construct of the

present facts, can Mr. Jacobsen or his employer be liable to Mr.
Remm's insurer for PIP benefits.
Alternatively,

if Utah Valley

Community

College

is the

properly named defendant, then the plaintiff has failed to comply
with the Governmental Immunity Act's strict notice requirements or
with the applicable statute of limitations.

4

ARGUMENT
POINT I
PLAINTIFF'S COMPLAINT MUST BE DISMISSED FOR
FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM IN LAW OR IN FACT
AGAINST THE TORT-FEASOR OR THE TORT-FEASOR'S
EMPLOYER FOR RECOVERY OF PIP BENEFITS.
It is well settled in this state that an injured party's
insurer has no claim for recovery of PIP benefits against a secured
owner or operator of a vehicle.

Laub v. South Central Utah

Telephone Asso., 657 P.2d 1304, 1308 (Utah 1982); Allstate v. I vie.
606 P.2d 1197, 1201 (Utah 1980).
In reaching this result, the Utah Supreme Court in Ivie
relied, in part, on the language now found in Utah Code Ann. § 31A22-309(1), (1953, as amended):
No person has direct benefit coverage under a
policy
which
includes
personal
injury
protection may maintain a cause of action for
general damages arising out of personal
injuries alleged to have been caused by an
automobile accident except where the person
has sustained one or more of the following:
(a) deaf; (b) dismemberment; (c) permanent
disability; (d) permanent disfigurement; or
(e) medical expenses to a person in excess of
$3,000.00.
Accordingly, PIP benefits up to the amount of $3,000 which are
paid

to an

injured person without

regard

to

fault

are not

recoverable from an insured tort-feasor by either the injured party
or his insurer. U.S. Fidelity & Guarantee v. United States, 728 F.
Supp. 651, 655 (D. Utah 1989).
In the U.S. Fidelity case, the Federal District Court,
applying

Utah

law,

rejected

plaintiff's

argument

that

the

government, being self-insured, was in similar circumstances to a

tort-feasor's insurance company and was therefore subject to intercompany reimbursement under Utah Code Ann. § 31A-22-309(6) (1953,
as amended).
Simply put, under the law of this state, the insurer (Bear
River Mutual Insurance Company) has no right of subrogation as to
funds obtained by the insured through either settlement or judgment
against the tort-feasor.
Asso. , 657 P. 2d at 1309.

Laub v. South Central Utah Telephone
The no-fault insurer's only right of

reimbursement through subrogation is against the liability insurer
in an arbitration proceeding. Allstate Ins. Co. v. Ivie, 606 P.2d
at 1202.
In this case, the no-fault insurer has made no claim against
the liability insurer.

Even if it had, his sole remedy would be

through arbitration. Consequently, plaintiff's Complaint fails as
a matter of law.
POINT II
PLAINTIFF'S SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION FAILS SINCE
THERE IS NO CONTRACT BETWEEN THE PLAINTIFF
INSURER AND THE DEFENDANT EMPLOYER.
Plaintiff's second cause of action, an apparent attempt to
evade

application

of

the Governmental

requirements, is fundamentally flawed.

Immunity Act's

notice

There is no contract, nor

is there privity of contract, between plaintiff and defendants.
Further, there is no basis to imply a contract from the language of
the insurance code.

Simply, Utah Valley Community College is not

an "insurer" and is therefore not governed by the provisions of the
Utah Insurance Code.
6

Specifically,

Utah

Code Ann.

§ 31A-1-301(48)(a)

defines

"insurer" and states that the definition of insurer "does not
include a government entity as defined in § 63-30-2(3) to the
extent it is engaged in activities described in § 31A-12-107."
Section 31A-12-107 states that a governmental entity, such as Utah
Valley Community College in this action, is not an insurer, for the
purposes of this title and is not engaged in the business of
insurance.
To fall under the holding of Neel v. State, plaintiff would
have had to sue the State of Utah and argue the State was a selfinsurer.

Neel held that a suit to recover PIP benefits brought

directly against the State as the self-insurer of its motor
vehicles is contractual in nature and therefore plaintiff need not
comply with the notice of claim and undertaking requirements found
in the Governmental Immunity Act.
State

is deemed

to be

Further, Neel held that if the

a self-insurer

of

the vehicle, then

arbitration is the sole legal means for plaintiff to attempt to
recover payment of PIP benefits.

Cf.

McCafferv on behalf of

McCafferv v. Grow, 787 P.2d 901 (Utah App. 1990).
Alternatively, if Bear River Mutual Insurance Company wanted
to recover personal injury protection benefits from the insurer of
the vehicle, Risk Management for the State of Utah should have been
the named defendant. Since this action was brought solely against
Jacobsen and Utah Valley Community College and not against the
State of Utah, plaintiff's Complaint fails as a matter of law.
Plaintiffs in similar situations have been denied subrogation
7

claims for recovery of PIP benefits.

See Allstate v. Ivie, 606

P.2d 1197, 1202-3 (Utah 1980); U.S. Fidelity & Guarantee v. U.S.,
728 F. Supp. 651, 655 (D. Utah 1989).
Also, State employees may not be entitled to recover from the
State for PIP benefits because of the exclusive remedy provision of
the Workers Compensation Act.

See Neel v. State, 854 P. 2d 581, 585

footnote 3 (Utah 1993) (citing IML Freight, Inc. v. Ottosen, 538
P. 2d 296 (Utah 1975)) (holding employees may not recover additional
benefits

from

an

employer's

no-fault

Consequently, even if plaintiff

insurance

policy).

argued Jacobsen should

recover

against the State on Remm's behalf, Jacobsen would be precluded
from such recovery.
POINT III
PLAINTIFF'S FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION SOUNDING IN
NEGLIGENCE WAS PROPERLY DISMISSED
Assuming

Utah

Valley

Community

College

is

the

proper

defendant, the cause of action sounding in negligence must be
dismissed for failure to state a claim.
Governmental

Specifically, Utah's

Immunity Act requires that a compulsory

condition

precedent to maintaining a negligence action against the State, any
of its agencies, or a political subdivision, is that an individual
must file a notice of claim.
(1953, as amended).

See Utah Code Ann. §§ 63-30-12 and 13

The claim is "barred unless notice of claim is

filed with the Attorney General and the agency concerned within one
year after the claim arises, or before the expiration of any
extension of time granted under § 63-30-11."
30-12 (Supp. 1989) .
8

Utah Code Ann. § 63-

The

notice

of

claim

requirements

set

forth

in

Utah's

Governmental Immunity Act are mandatory and "strict compliance" is
the statutory standard.

The Utah Supreme Court has held that

"where a cause of action is based upon a statute, full compliance
with its requirements is a condition precedent to the right to
maintain a suit." Scarbourqh v. Granite School District, 531 P.2d
480, 482 (Utah 1975).
In the present case, plaintiff's cause of action arose on
February 15, 1991, the date of Remm's accident. Plaintiff alleges
that it filed a notice of claim with Salt Lake County on March 28,
1991.

This notice of claim is of no affect since Salt Lake County

has no governing relationship to Utah Valley Community College
whatsoever.
To establish notice of claim was properly served on Utah
Valley Community College, plaintiff must establish that it served
its notice of claim on both Attorney General's office and on Utah
Valley Community College.

A search of the notices of claim

received by the Attorney General's office failed to produce a
notice of claim from either Larry J. Remm or Bear River Mutual
Insurance Company.
Addendum E.)

(See Affidavit of Shauna Herrera, attached as

Plaintiff has never even alleged that notice was

served on Utah Valley Community College in this action.
Finally, even if we construe plaintiff's attempts to file
proper notice as adequate, plaintiff's complaint was not filed in
a timely manner and is therefore barred.
Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-15 requires a claimant to begin the
9

action within one year after the denial of the claim or within one
year after the 90-day denial period specified in § 63-30-14.
Plaintiff alleges it filed a notice of claim on March 28, 1991 and
that the claim was denied.

If we assume that the claim was denied

by allowing the 90-day denial period to run, plaintiff's claim was
deemed to have been denied on June 26, 1991. Therefore, plaintiff
was required to file its Complaint by June 26, 1992.

In fact,

plaintiff's Complaint is dated September 26, 1992.
Consequently, plaintiff's action is barred due to its failure
to service a notice of claim on both the Attorney General's office
and Utah Valley Community College and due to its failure to file a
Complaint within the statutorily prescribed period as provided in
Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-15(2).

Plaintiff's Complaint was properly

dismissed.
CONCLUSION
Despite

the

fact

plaintiff

has

attempted

to

amend

its

Complaint, Bear River Mutual Insurance Company has failed to
identify the proper party to this action. Accordingly, plaintiff's
Complaint was properly dismissed.

For the above reasons, the

judgment of the district court should be affirmed.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this

1|

day of March, 1994.

JAN GRAHAM
Attorney General

SidSt

ELIZABETH KING
Assistant Attorney General
Attorney for DefendantAppellee
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that two true and accurate copies of the
foregoing BRIEF OF APPELLEES was mailed this 14 day of March,
1994, postage prepaid, to:
Thomas A. Duffin
JENSEN, DUFFIN, CARMAN, DIBB
& JACKSON
311 South State, Suite 380
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellant
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ADDENDUM A

GENERAL PROVISIONS

31A-1-301

(e) providing other persons with insurance as defined in Subsection (40);
(f) making as insurer, guarantor, or surety, or proposing to make
as insurer, guarantor, or surety, any contract or policy of title insurance;
(g) transacting or proposing to transact any phase of title insurance, including solicitation, negotiation preliminary to execution, execution of a contract of title insurance, insuring, and transacting
matters subsequent to the execution of the contract and arising out of
it, including reinsurance; and
(h) doing, or proposing to do, any business in substance equivalent
to Subsections (a) through (g) in a manner designed to evade the
provisions of this title.
(45) "Insurance consultant" or "consultant" means a person who advises other persons about insurance needs and coverages, is compensated
by the person advised on a basis not directly related to the insurance
placed, and is not compensated directly or indirectly by an insurer, agent,
or broker for advice given. Refer also to Subsection 31A-23-102(3) for
exceptions to this definition.
(46) "Insurance holding company system" means a group of two or
more affiliated persons, at least one of whom is an insurer.
(47) "Insured" means a person to whom or for whose benefit an insurer
makes a promise in an insurance policy. The term includes policyholders,
subscribers, members, and beneficiaries. This definition applies only to
the provisions of this title and does not define the meaning of this word as
used in insurance policies or certificates.
(48) (a) "Insurer" means any person doing an insurance business as a
principal, including fraternal benefit societies, issuers of gift annuities other than those specified in Subsections 31A-22-1305(2) and
(3), motor clubs, employee welfare plans, and any person purporting
or intending to do an insurance business as a principal on his own
account. It does not include a governmental entity, as defined in
Subsection 63-30-2(3), to the extent it is engaged in the activities
described in Section 31A-12-107.
(b) "Admitted insurer" is defined in Subsection (80)(b).
(c) "Alien insurer" is defined in Subsection (3).
(d) "Authorized insurer" is defined in Subsection (80)(b).
(e) "Domestic insurer" is defined in Subsection (27).
(f) "Foreign insurer" is defined in Subsection (32).
(g) "Nonadmitted insurer" is defined in Subsection (80)(a).
(h) "Unauthorized insurer" is defined in Subsection (80)(a).
(49) "Legal expense insurance" means insurance written to indemnify
or pay for specified legal expenses. It includes arrangements that create
reasonable expectations of enforceable rights, but it does not include the
provision of, or reimbursement for, legal services incidental to other insurance coverages. Refer to Section 31A-1-103 for a list of exemptions.
(50) (a) "Liability insurance" means insurance against liability:
(i) for death, injury, or disability of any human being, or for
damage to property, exclusive of the coverages under Subsection
(53) for medical malpractice insurance, Subsection (66) for pro-

31A-12-107. Governmental immunity.
Notwithstanding any other provision of this title, a governmental entity, as
defined in Subsection 63-30-2(3), is not an insurer for purposes of this title and
is not engaged in the business of insurance to the extent it is covering its own
liabilities under Chapter 30, Title 63, the Governmental Immunity Act, or
engaging in other related risk management activities related to the normal
course of its activities. A public agency insurance mutual created or regulated
under Section 31A-5-214 is a governmental entity entitled to all the rights
and benefits of the Governmental Immunity Act.
History: C. 1953, 31A-12-107, enacted by
L. 1986, ch. 204, * 87; 1987 (1st S.S.), ch. 12,
§7.
Amendment Notes. — The 1987 (1st S.S.)
amendment, effective June 5,1987, substituted
"Chapter 30, Title 63, the Governmental Immunity Act" for "the Governmental Immunity

Act, Chapter 30, Title 63" in the first sentence
and substituted the present second sentence for
the former second sentence which read "A public agency mutual created under Section
31A-5-214 is an insurer and is engaged in the
business of insurance."

31A-22-309

INSURANCE CODE

(b) The provisions of this subsection do not limit the exclusions which
may be contained in other types of coverage.
(3) The benefits payable to any injured person under Section 31A-22-307
are reduced by:
(a) any benefits which that person receives or is entitled to receive as a
result of an accident covered in this code under any workers' compensation or similar statutory plan; and
(b) any amounts which that person receives or is entitled to receive
from the United States or any of its agencies because he is on active duty
in the military service.
(4) When a person injured is also an insured party under any other policy,
including those policies complying with this part, primary coverage is given
by the policy insuring the motor vehicle in use during the accident.
(5) Payment of the benefits provided for in Section 31A-22-307 shall be
made on a monthly basis as expenses are incurred. Benefits for any period are
overdue if they are not paid within 30 days after the insurer receives reasonable proof of the fact and amount of expenses incurred during the period. If
reasonable proof is not supplied as to the entire claim, the amount supported
by reasonable proof is overdue if not paid within 30 days after that proof is
received by the insurer. Any part or all of the remainder of the claim that is
later supported by reasonable proof is also overdue if not paid within 30 days
after the proof is received by the insurer. If the insurer fails to pay the expenses when due, these expenses shall bear interest at the rate of \lk% per
month after the due date. The person entitled to the benefits may bring an
action in contract to recover the expenses plus the applicable interest. If the
insurer is required by the action to pay any overdue benefits and interest, the
insurer is also required to pay a reasonable attorney's fee to the claimant.
(6) Every policy providing personal injury protection coverage is subject to
the following:
(a) that where the insured under the policy is or would be held legally
liable for the personal injuries sustained by any person to whom benefits
required under personal injury protection have been paid by another insurer, including the Workers' Compensation Fund of Utah, the insurer of
the person who would be held legally liable shall reimburse the other
insurer for the payment, but not in excess of the amount of damages
recoverable; and
(b) that the issue of liability for that reimbursement and its amount
shall be decided by mandatory, binding arbitration between the insurers.
History: C. 1953, 31A-22-309, enacted by
L. 1985, ch. 242, $ 27; 1986, ch. 204, * 160;
1988 (2nd S.S.), ch. 10, * 10; 1991, ch. 74, * 8;
1992, ch. 230, $ 9.
Amendment Notes. — The 1991 amendment, effective Apnl 29,1991, made minor stylistic changes in Subsection (1) and rewrote

Subsection (2 Ha Hi), which read: "for any injuries sustained by the injured while occupying
another motor vehicle owned by the insured
and not insured under the policy."
The 1992 amendment, effective Apnl 27,
1992, inserted "or is required to have" near the
beginning of Subsection (1).

63-30-2. Definitions.
As used in this chapter:
(1) "Claim" means any claim or cause of action for money or damages
against a governmental entity or against an employee.
(2) (a) "Employee" includes a governmental entity's officers, employees, servants, trustees, commissioners, members of a governing
body, members of a board, members of a commission, or members of
an advisory body, officers and employees in accordance with Section
62A-4-603, student teachers certificated in accordance with Section
53A-6-101, educational aides, students engaged in providing services
to members of the public in the course of an approved medical, nursing, or other professional health care clinical training program, volunteers, and tutors, but does not include an independent contractor.
(b) "Employee" includes all of the positions identified in Subsection (2)(a), whether or not the individual holding that position receives compensation.
(3) "Governmental entity" means the state and its political subdivisions as defined in this chapter.
(4) (a) "Governmental function" means any act, failure to act, operation, function, or undertaking of a governmental entity whether or
not the act, failure to act, operation, function, or undertaking is char-

63-30-12. Claim against state or its employee — Time for
filing notice.
A claim against the state, or against its employee for an act or omission
occurring during the performance of his duties, within the scope of employment, or under color of authority, is barred unless notice of claim isfiledwith
the attorney general and the agency concerned within one year after the claim
arises, or before the expiration of any extension of time granted under Section
63-30-11, regardless of whether or not the function giving rise to the claim is
characterized as governmental.
History: L. 1965, ch. 139, § 12; 1978, ch.
27, § 6; 1983, ch. 131, § 2; 1987, ch. 75, § 5.
Amendment Notes. — The 1987 amendment near the end of the section substituted
"Section 63-30-11" for "Subsection 63-30-11(4)"
and added "regardless of whether or not the
function giving rise to the claim is character-

ized as governmental" and made minor
changes in phraseology.
Cross-References. — Actions arising out of
contractual rights or obligations not subject to
this section, § 63-30-5.
Health Care Malpractice Act, § 78-14-1 et
seq.

63-30-15. Denial of claim for injury — Authority and time
for filing action against governmental entity.
(1) If the claim is denied, a claimant may institute an action in the district
court against the governmental entity or an employee of the entity.
(2) The claimant shall begin the action within one year after denial of the
claim or within one year after the denial period specified in this chapter has
GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY ACT

63-30-16

expired, regardless of whether or not the function giving rise to the claim is
characterized as governmental.
History: L. 1965, ch. 139, f 15; 1963, ch.
129, i 6; 1965, ch. 62, f 2; 1967, ch. 75, f 7.
Amendment Note*. — The 1985 amendment substituted "or an employee of the entity" for "in those circumstances in which immunityfrom suit has been waived in this chapter" at the end of the first sentence.

The 1987 amendment a*. . the designations to the previously undesignated section; in
Subsection (2), added at the end nregardless of
whether or not the function giving rise to the
&}& ^ characterized as governmental"; and
n ^ ^^^ changes in phraseology
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<Wf£

BECEWED
SEP \ 1 W
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT CO
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

MINUTE ENTRY
BEAR RIVER MUTUAL
PLAINTIFF

vs
JACOBSEN, MIKE

CASE NUMBER 920905486 PD
DATE 09/15/93
HONORABLE TYRONE E. MEDLEY
COURT REPORTER
CQURT CLERK AJG

DEFENDANT

TYPE OF HEARING:
PRESENT:
P. ATTY. DUFFIN, THOMAS A.
D. ATTY. OCHOA, BARBARA H

PLAINTIFFS MOTION TO VACE MINUE ENTRY DATED JUNE 16,1993, MOTION
TO FILE AMENDED COMPLAINT, AND MOTION FOR ADDITIONAL ORAL
ARGUMENT ARE SUMMARILY DENIED FOR THE FOLLOWING REASONS;
1) THE JUNE 16, 1993 MINUTE ENTRY ENCOMPASED THE ISSUES
RAISED IN THE FOREGOING MOTIONS.
2) THE COURT REVIEWED NEIL VS STATE OF UTAH PRIOR TO
PREPARATION OF JUNE 16, 1993 MINUTE ENTRY AND FOUND
NEIL TO BE DISTINGUISHABLE FFROM THE PRESENT CASE.
3) THE COURT SUBMITS SECOND REOUEST TO THE STATE OF UTAH
TO PREPARE AN ORDER CONSISTENT WITH THIS MINUTE ENTRY
AND THE JUNE 16, 1993 MINUTE ENTRY
CC: THOMAS A DUFFIN
BARBARA H. OCHOA

ADDENDUM C

Third Jucu;.-

OCT 1 3 1993

:-3b-.y CierK

JAN GRAHAM - 1231
Attorney General
BARBARA E. OCHOA - 4102
Assistant Attorney General
Attorney for Defendants
330 South 300 East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 575-1650
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
BEAR RIVER MUTUAL
INSURANCE COMPANY

ORDER OF DISMISSAL

Plaintiff,
vs.
MIKE JACOBSEN and UTAH
VALLEY COMMUNITY COLLEGE,
a body politic of the
State of Utah,

:
Civil No. 920905486PD
:
Judge Tyrone E. Medley

Defendants.

:

This matter came before the Court on April 19, 1993 on
Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, the Honorable Tyrone E. Medley
presiding. Plaintiff was represented by counsel, Thomas A. Duffin,
and Defendant was represented by counsel, Barbara E. Ochoa,
Assistant Attorney General. In addition, the Court has considered
the

following

Plaintiff:

motions

which

were

subsequently

submitted

by

Motion to Vacate Minute Entry Dated June 16, 1993;

Motion to File Amended Complaint; and Motion for Additional Oral
Argument.
The Court having reviewed the pleadings on file, having heard
the argument of counsel, and being fully advised in the premises,

now orders as follows:
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that:
1. Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's first cause of
action is granted for the reason that Plaintiff failed to comply
with the strict notice requirements of the Utah Governmental
Immunity Act.
2. Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's second cause of
action is granted for the reason that Plaintiff's complaint fails
to state a claim upon which relief may be granted under U.C.A.
§ 31A-22-309(5).
3. Plaintiff's Motions to Vacate Minute Entry Dated June 16,
1993, to File an Amended Complaint and for Additional Oral Argument
are denied for the reasons that the June 16, 1993 minute entry
encompassed the issues raised in Plaintiff's subsequent motions and
the Court had reviewed Neel v. State of Utah prior to issuing the
Minute Entry of June 16, 1993, and found it to be distinguishable
from the present case.
DATED this

/?

__^__
day of

6/ y

BY TJffi COURT:

10NE E. MEDLEY
Thircfl/ District Court b%t&g
Approved as to form:
THOMAS A. DUFFIN
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ADDENDUM E

JAN GRAHAM - 1231
Attorney General
BARBARA OCHOA - 4102
Assistant Attorney General
Attorney for Defendants
330 South 300 East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 575-1650

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

BEAR RIVER MUTUAL INSURANCE
COMPANY,
AFFIDAVIT OF SHAUNA HERRERA
Plaintiff,
vs.
Civil No. 920905486PD
MIKE JACOBSEN and UTAH VALLEY
COMMUNITY COLLEGE, a body
politic of the State of Utah,

Judge Glenn Iwasaki

Defendant.

STATE OF UTAH

)

COUNTY OF SALT LAKE

j

I, Shauna Herrera, being first duly sworn upon oath,
depose and state as follows:
1.

That I am# and at all times referred to herein was,

the Lead Secretary for the Litigation Division of the Attorney
General's Office for the State of Utah.

That this Affidavit is

based upon my own personal knowledge and upon the records and

files maintained by the Utah Attorney General's Office in the
ordinary and regular course of its business.
2.

That in connection with my duties as said, I

maintain under my custody and control, all notices of claim
received by the Utah Attorney General's Office and have done so
since December 27, 1982.
3.

That I have reviewed the notices of claim received

by the Utah Attorney General's Office, including the period
February 15, 1991 to the present, and no notice of claim from or
on behalf of Larry J. Remm or Bear River Mutual Insurance Company
has been received by the Utah Attorney General's Office.

My Commission Expires:

7/?/ffr
2

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
This is to certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of
the foregoing DEFENDANTS' MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF'S

MOTION TO FILE AN AMENDED COMPLAINT, postage prepaid, this
day of February, 1993, to the following:
Thomas A. Duffin
JENSEN, DUFFIN, CARMAN, DIBB & JACKSON
Attorneys for Plaintiff
311 South State Street, Suite 380
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
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